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Introduction 
 
 
For a period in the later 1980s and early 1990s, the idea of a Europe of the regions gained 
political prominence within the European Union. Though the idea of a Europe of the 
regions was an old one, it was given contemporary resonance in this period due to the 
European Union’s structural fund reforms in 1988 which gave a new level of prominence 
to regional governments, with those regional governments also seeking some level of 
institutional representation within the EU. The outcome of this pressure was twofold: the 
creation of the Committee of the Regions as a consultative body within the EU (Loughlin 
1996, Kennedy 1997), comprised of members of local and regional authorities, and the 
passage of the Treaty of European Union (Maastricht), which gave regional governments 
the constitutional ability to represent Member State interests within the Council of 
Ministers. For regional governments (as well as local governments), there was now a 
level of institutional recognition in the EU, with efforts to improve the regional level at 
subsequent EU treaty revisions at Amsterdam, Nice and then with the Convention on the 
Future of Europe. At this latter juncture, some regional governments had grouped 
together to establish the Congress of Local And Regional Authorities in Europe in 1999. 
This body sought to promote the interest of ‘constitutional regions’ in the EU – meaning 
those regions with strong powers and the ability to make legislation. This organisation 
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also gave birth to REGLEG (Regions with legislative powers) and sought to promote 
greater representation for constitutional regions in the EU, a defined role for the regions 
in the EU constitution, a clear definition of powers and functions between the EU, 
national and subnational level, a strengthening of the Committee of the Regions and a 
direct right of appeal for regions to the European Court of Justice (Lynch 2004).1 
 
Of course, these institutional developments are a small element of what would be a more 
ambitious view of a Europe of the Regions held by federalists and regionalists. The idea 
of a Europe of the Regions has been around for decades, though not necessarily in any 
coherent form. A Europe of the Regions has been seen as both a slogan (Loughlin 1996a: 
150) and utopian vision for regionalists (Borras-Alomar et al, 1994: 2). The idea 
originated in the work of federalist writers such as Denis De Rougement (1966) and Guy 
Heraud (1974), who sought to promote European integration but also a role for regions in 
the political process. Heraud, for example, saw Europe as a federation of regions as 
opposed to a construction of artificial nation-states (Heraud, 1974). This idea had also 
been explored before this by committed regionalists such as the Bretons Maurice 
Duhamel (Dumhamel 1928) and Yann Fouere, with his idea of a Europe of a hundred 
flags (Fouere, 1968) as well as in Flanders by Maurits Van Haegendoren (1971). Such 
ideas provided some of the background to regionalist party thinking about European 
integration and these ideas, in addition to post-war consensus on the need for European 
co-operation to avoid military conflicts generated regionalist support for European 
unification (Lynch 1996). Besides a generally positive outlook towards Europe, 
regionalist parties found the Europe of the regions idea attractive because of hostility to 
centralised states but also to the perceived impact of European institutions in reducing the 
powers of the state upwards, whilst the regional level of government would reduce the 
powers of the state downwards: a regionalist version of the withering away of the nation-
state.  
 
The Europe of the regions idea has also been championed by regionalist parties, as an 
alternative to a state-centric European Union. Indeed, with some exceptions, most of the 
regionalist family is broadly supportive of European integration as a principle, though 
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with qualifications on the exact nature of integration in relation to EU institutions, the 
policies pursued at the EU level and the various changes proposed to the EU treaties. 
Whilst individual regionalist parties have policies on EU policies, many of the parties are 
members of the European Free Alliance-Democratic Party of the Peoples of Europe, 
which operates as a transnational federation of most regionalists and acts as a collective 
voice in the EU and European Parliament. Thus, whilst regional governments have had 
representative organisations such as the Assembly of Regions, CALRE, Committee of the 
Regions, etc, regionalist parties have used the EFA-DPPE organisation to advance their 
cause in the European Parliament and Committee of the Regions. This is a much smaller 
focus than the COR, as most regions do not have regionalist parties, even though they 
may have regional governments. For much of its existence, the story of the EFA-DPPE 
has developed in two parts – firstly, successfully building up the organisation as a party 
family, secondly, struggling to establish a regionalist political group in the European 
Parliament. This latter enterprise has been problematic from the outset in 1979 but 
particularly so after the declining electoral fortunes of regionalist parties at the post-
enlargement 2004 European elections. This article will examine the 2004 performance in 
particular, in order to determine whether 2004 is indicative of an overall shrinkage in the 
political space for regionalist parties and the decline in saliency of the centre-periphery 
cleavage (Bartolini, 2005).  
 
The Development of the European Free Alliance and Regionalist Representation in 
the European Parliament 
 
The EFA-DPPE and Policy Integration Though the European Free Alliance started 
out with 6 founding members in 1981, it grew to 31 full members and 2 observer party 
members in 2007 (see table 1). However, expansion in the size of the party family has 
been incomplete. Indeed, the European Free Alliance can be considered as a weak but 
growing party family. Since its inception, the EFA has succeeded in organising the 
majority of active regionalist parties in Western Europe into its ranks. However, some of 
these parties are small and attract little electoral support. The EFA did manage to include 
the larger parties such as the SNP in the 1980s, the Lega Nord in the 1990s (until its 
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expulsion in 1994) and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco as an EFA observer from 1999-
2004. However, the fact that not all regionalist parties are within the EFA is significant, 
as it has rendered the EFA as an incomplete family representative (De Winter 2001). The 
most prominent examples are Convergencia i Unio in Catalonia, which has never joined 
the European Free Alliance or associated with other regionalists in the European 
Parliament; the Lega Nord in Italy, which was an EFA member in the early 1990s before 
its expulsion from the organisation through its association with the AN in the 1994 
centre-right coalition government of Berlusconi; the Süd-tiroler Volkspartei in Italy and 
the Svenska folkparteit in Finland.2 What is crucial about these parties is that they enjoy 
electoral representation in their member states, with a role in government and 
representation in the European Parliament.3 The latter fact deprived the EFA-DPPE of 8 
MEPs in the European Parliament from 1999-2004 and then 6 MEPs from 2004 onwards 
(with 1 CDC, 1 PNV and 4 Lega Nord MEPs). Thus in the current period, the EFA-DPPE 
has only 5 MEPs from the regionalist family. In addition, there are a number of outliers 
within the regionalist party family who do not associate with the EFA or rather parties 
that the EFA would refuse to have as a member. The former Herri Batasuna from the 
Basque Country is one example, whilst the Vlaams Belang (formerly Vlaams Blok) is 
another. Whilst the autonomy goals of these two parties might fit with the European Free 
Alliance, their ideological attributes, policies and strategies do not.  However, they add to 
the fragmented nature of the regionalist political family and the lack of fit between the 
EFA-DPPE and the universe of regionalist parties. 
 
 
Table 1. Membership of the European Free Alliance-Democratic Party of the 
Peoples of Europe 2007 
 
Full Members (state)    Observer Members (state) 
 
Alleanza Libera Emiliana (Italy)   Liga Transilvania-Banat (Romania) 
Ålands Framtid (Sweden)    Magyar Foderalista Part (Slovakia) 
Bloque Nacionalista Galego (Spain)    
 5 
Chunta Aragonesista (Spain)  
Enotna Lista (Austria) 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Spain)   
Eusko Alkartasuna (Spain)     
Fryske Nasjonale Partij (Netherlands)   
Liga Fronte Veneto (Italy)     
Ligue Savoisienne (France) 
Lithuanian Polish Peoples Party (Lithuania) 
Mebyon Kernow (UK) 
Moravané (Czech Republic) 
Mouvement Région Savoie (France) 
Partido Andalucista (Spain) 
Partei Deutschsprachigen Belgier (Belgium) 
Partit Occitan (France) 
Partit Socialista de Mallorca (Spain)  
Partito Sardo D’Azione (Italy) 
Partitu di a Nazione Corsa (France) 
Plaid Cymru (UK) 
Ruch Autonomii Slaska (Poland) 
Scottish National Party (UK) 
Slovenska Skupnost (Italy) 
SPIRIT (Belgium) 
Union Démocratique Bretonne (France) 
Union de Peuple Alsacien (France) 
Union für Südtirol (Italy) 
Union Valdôtaine (Italy) 
Unitat Catalunya (France) 
Vinozhito Rainbow Party (Greece) 
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As the EFA-DPPE has grown, so has its common policy platform, though the depth of 
common policies is limited, even in the area of regional/national autonomy and the notion 
of a Europe of the regions. The regionalist family is not only ideologically diverse, but 
also features a variety of autonomy goals, even though united by the ‘core business’ of 
autonomy. This has effected the EFA’s position on a Europe of the regions as well as on 
other EU policies. For example, it would be difficult for regionalists to adopt a common 
constitutional model for the EU either individually or as part of a common programme 
within the EFA-DPPE organisation. For example, individual regionalist parties support 
independence (SNP), full sovereignty (PNV), have ambiguous attitudes to independence 
and autonomy (Plaid Cymru), support federalism (Volksunie/SPIRIT,4 Partido 
Andalucista) and support regional autonomy. This diversity of opinion is reflected in the 
EFA-DPPE’s stance on European integration and regional autonomy. In its 2005 statutes, 
the EFA-DPPE stated that it supported ‘European unity and the creation of a European 
union of free peoples based on the principle of subsidiarity who believe in solidarity with 
each other and other peoples of the world’ in addition to ‘promoting the European 
integration based on the diversity of peoples, cultures, languages and regions.’5 This 
position on the regionalists’ ‘core business’ is obviously quite vague, reflecting the 
difficulties of generating an acceptable common position that reflects the variety of 
specific regionalist autonomy goals, not least when the parties’ goals have evolved 
through both European integration and internal changes.6 
 
Over time, the EFA began to develop a common platform that began as a set of common 
principles and then evolved into broader manifestos and policy positions. The EFA-DPPE 
parties are pro-European integration, seek defence/promotion of minority languages and 
support greater autonomy and representation for regions within EU institutions. In 2000, 
the EFA-DPPE sought to define itself as a proponent of ‘progressive nationalism’ 
meaning a party committed to: 
 
• democracy and constitutionalism 
• respect for human rights and minorities 
• opposition to racism and xenophobia 
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• civic and inclusive identities 
• universal support for rights to self-determination of stateless nations 
• pluralism over the constitutional form of self-determination 
• peaceful political activities 
• sustainable development and cultural and ecological diversity (EFA-DPPE 2000: 2) 
 
The institutionalisation of the EFA-DPPE within the European Parliament and its 
participation in the Greens-EFA political group has led to a range of different policy 
positions and activities. The EFA-DPPE adopts policy positions in relation to sustainable 
development (Greens/EFA 2001); the main themes at European Council summits 
(Green/EFA 2002); a position on globalisation at the world parliamentary forum in Porto 
Alegre (Green/EFA 2002a); a policy towards the Convention on the Future of Europe 
(Green/EFA 2002b); and policy and participation at the United Nations summit on 
sustainable development in Johannesburg. These types of policy positions, in addition to 
policy stances adopted by the EFA at its general assemblies and the positions adopted by 
its MEPs mean that the EFA is now a much deeper organisation in terms of policy than it 
was at its inception. Not only have member parties adopted common policies, but policies 
in line with Green parties, which will become part of the platforms of new political 
parties joining the EFA-DPPE in future through enlargement: all examples of the impact 
of the Europeanisation of political parties that has been driven by European integration 
(De Winter and Gomez-Reino 2002). 
 
European Parliament Representation The political parties associated with the 
European Free Alliance have struggled in relation to representation in the European 
Parliament. The EFA had some transnational predecessors in the 1940s (FUEN and the 
International Congress of European Nations and Regions) and the 1970s (the Bureau of 
Unrepresented European Nations), though most inter-regionalist contact occurred 
bilaterally between individual parties (Lynch 1996: 135-141). However, European 
integration in the specific form of direct elections to the European Parliament from 1979 
onwards altered such practices considerably. Indeed, European elections drove the 
formation of the EFA, efforts at the construction of a regionalist political family, the 
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establishment of a regionalist political group in the European Parliament as well as the 
development of cross-party co-operation between regionalists within EU member states 
to create electoral alliances for European elections (especially in France, Italy and Spain). 
However, whilst European elections have driven the construction of the EFA, the EFA 
has been least successful in relation to elections to the European Parliament, with very 
few of the EFA-DPPE parties succeeding in electing MEPs. For example, only 8 of the 
31 existing EFA-DPPE members have elected MEPs since 1979. Moreover only 7 of 
those parties had MEPs in the 1999-2004 European Parliament, with one of them, from 
the Union Valdôtaine sitting with the ELDR not the other EFA-DPPE parties within the 
Green-EFA political group. The post-2004 position, despite enlargement, is not much 
better – with only 5 EFA MEPs.  
 
The most striking characteristic about the impact of the regionalist political family in the 
European Parliament has been its failure to produce a regionalist political group. The 
EFA and DPPE emerged, but a strong and coherent regionalist political group has 
continued to elude the EFA parties. Instead, regionalist MEPs have participated in a 
range of political groups within the parliament. The EFA core around the Volksunie (now 
represented in the EFA by SPIRIT), was a member of five different groups since 1979 
(see table 2). The Technical Co-ordination Group from 1979-84 was an ad hoc group of 
unattached MEPs, who sought to align to gain resources, committee memberships and 
staff: the prizes available to political groups. But, it only contained two regionalist MEPs, 
one from the Volksunie and one from the now extinct Rassemblement Wallon. Matters 
did not improve with Rainbow Group 1 from 1984-89, where 2 Volksunie MEPs and 1 
Partito Sardo d’Azione MEP sat with the Greens, anti-European Danish party and some 
other small parties. However, from 1989-1994, the EFA was the predominant numerical 
contingent with Rainbow Group 2: the nearest thing to a regionalist political group.7 The 
EFA parties performed badly at the 1994 European elections and were left to form a 
small part of an ad hoc group with Énergie Radical from France and the Radical Party 
from Italy. Things improved in 1999 when the EFA-DPPE was reunited with the Greens, 
in a much more coherent political group, but there are still more regionalist MEPs outside 
this group than the ten EFA-DPPE MEPs in the parliament. The situation since 2004 is 
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not dissimilar to this. The clear picture that emerges, though, is that the EFA’s difficulties 
at group formation have become a permanent difficulty following each European election 
and that the EFA-DPPE has failed to organise all its potential parties within one political 
group. The EFA-DPPE may have become institutionalised as a party family, but the 
family has never become institutionalised in the European Parliament, in spite of over 25 
years of organisational efforts, alliance-formation and bridge-building amongst 
regionalist and non-regionalist parties. And, of course, a changing constellation of states, 
regions and political parties through successive periods of EU enlargement. 
 
Table 2. The EFA-DPPE and Political Groups in the European Parliament 1979-2009 
 
Session Group Name    Regionalist MEPs (group total) 
1979-84 Technical co-ordination group 2 (12) 
1984-89 Rainbow Group 1   3 (20) 
1989-1994 Rainbow Group 2   8 (15) 
1994-1999 European Radical Alliance  4 (19) 
1999-2004 Greens-European Free Alliance 10 (45) 
2004-2009 Greens-European Free Alliance 5 (42) 
 
 
EU Enlargement  The imminent prospect of EU enlargement in 2004 provoked efforts at 
EFA-enlargement: though this activity has been a constant one since the establishment of 
the European Free Alliance in 1981. However, given the political landscape in the East 
with relatively new, weak and unstable regionalist political parties, extending the EFA 
family has not been easy. The positive side of enlargement for the EFA was the large 
number of ethnic and linguistic minorities in the Eastern states though the negative side 
was the political complexion of some of these parties and the absence of regional 
governments in the acceding states. Whilst there are clear minority questions in states 
such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, very few of these minorities have 
strong language or regionalist political parties: the Hungarian communities in Rumania 
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and Slovakia stand out as the only substantial examples. Moreover, these is little of the 
‘bottom-up regionalism’ found in Western Europe (Keating and Loughlin 1997), where 
regionalist parties have politicised the centre-periphery cleavage to the extent that central 
governments have established regional government (Keating and Hughes 2003). Regional 
structures have been on the agendas of Eastern European governments in recent years, 
with decentralisation linking up with the need to manage EU structural funds in the 
regions, but there are few similarities at this time with the Basque Country, Catalonia, 
Flanders or Scotland. This is not to discount future developments however, for two 
reasons. First, regionalism as a political force can be quite fluid and unpredictable, clearly 
indicated by emergence of new regionalism through the unexpected rise of the Lega Nord 
in Italy, the Vlaams Blok in Flanders as well as smaller parties in France and Spain. 
Regionalism is not purely a product of the 1960s and 1970s. Second, regionalism is not 
merely the practice of political parties. Regional governments also drive regionalist 
policies and agendas. Despite their ethnic and linguistic homogeneity and lack of 
regionalist parties, the German Länder have been active in setting the regional agenda 
domestically and across Europe to become assertive policy actors within the European 
Union (e.g the Committee of the Regions and regional access to the Council of 
Ministers). The development of regional governments in Eastern European states in the 
coming years may therefore generate a form of regionalism that boosts regional 
involvement in EU institutions and policies. 
 
Whilst regionalist parties within the EFA-DPPE have been generally supportive of the 
last two decades of European deepening, they have faced a challenging political 
opportunity structure through the widening of the EU. Indeed, with the exception of 
Spanish accession in 1986, enlargement has brought little to the EFA-DPPE in the way of 
member parties, new allies and MEPs. Despite the fact that regionalists have not 
benefited from the enlargement of the EU to add Greece, Portugal, Austria, Finland and 
Sweden, followed by ten new states in 2004 and then Bulgaria and Rumania in 2007, the 
EFA-DPPE has grown, albeit through adding relatively small parties. However, it is 
arguable that the Eastern enlargement has had a negative impact on the EFA-DPPE, as it 
has markedly altered the balance of the EU away from states with strong regionalist 
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parties and regional governments. Enlargement in 2004 added ten predominantly 
centralised states to the European Union as opposed to regionalised or federal states.8 
Indeed, as this article will argue, whilst other Euro-parties benefited from enlargement at 
the European elections in 2004 and 2007  - with new states bringing large numbers of 
new MEPs – the EFA-DPPE struggled to maintain let alone expand its level of 
representation in the European Parliament. The nature of the expansion also made the 
prospect of a Europe of the regions even more remote. However, this situation is very 
much “problems as usual” for the EFA-DPPE. It has faced endemic problems in electing 
MEPs and constructing a political group from 1979 onwards: especially as EFA MEPs 
currently only represent 3 EU member states. Participation in political groups with MEPs 
from other party families has been the norm for the EFA-DPPE. 
 
The EFA itself sought to expand into the accession states and beyond. In the early 1990s, 
the Slovene minority party in Northeast Italy, Slovenska Skupnost and the Slovak 
independence party, Slovenska Narodna Strana joined the European Free Alliance.  
Similarly, the EFA and Rainbow Group became involved in the International Network of 
Centre Parties, to explore links with parties from Scandinavia (in preparation for Finland 
and Sweden joining the EU in 1995) as well as the Baltic states and East-central Europe. 
The EFA parties were involved in meetings in Poland and Estonia with centrist parties 
from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland, but the collapse of the Rainbow 
group in 1994 led to the abandonment of this project (Lynch 1996: 149). However, such 
efforts continued in the 1990s and into the new century. For example, representatives of 
the Hungarian minority came to Brussels to meet with the EFA in March 2001. An event 
quickly followed by the EFA visit to Slovakia in April 2001 to investigate the treatment 
of the Hungarian and Roma minorities in the accession state, and also explore the 
prospects for electoral co-operation and member parties. At the EFA general assembly in 
November 2001, four regional/minority parties joined the EFA as observers, with some 
subsequently becoming full members (see table 1). Further visits were made by the EFA 
to Poland in 2002 and 2003, with an EFA conference in Poland alongside the Silesian 
minority. The EFA also organised conferences in Lithuania in July 2003 and Romania in 
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September 2003, to explore minority issues as well as the prospects for post-enlargement 
electoral co-operation and EFA membership. 
 
One of the difficulties with the EFA expansion to the East is the quality, organisation and 
electoral presence of the various regionalist parties who have sought to become EFA 
members. For example, electoral data on the 4 parties from the accession states that have 
become members and observers of the EFA is extremely thin. Ruch Autonomii Slaska 
(established in 1990) from Poland did not feature prominently at the 2001 election to the 
Sejm, where it was part of the Civic Platform list, in contrast to Mniejszosc Niemiecka 
(MN - German Minority) which gained 47,230 votes (0.36%) in 2001 and then 34,469 
votes (0.3%) in 2005 and 2 seats on each occasion and Niemiecka Mniejszosc Górnego 
Slaska (MGS - German Minority of Upper Silesia) which gained 8,024 votes in 2001 
(0.06%). Ruch Autonomii Slaska and the MGS agreed to establish an electoral coalition 
for the local and regional elections of 2002, but there is no data on its performance at this 
election. Where Ruch Autonomii Slaska did perform at the 2001 election was in the 
Senate contest, where its candidates gained an average of 17% in the three main Silesian 
constituencies (Gliwice, Katowice and Rybnik) where it gained a total of 157,277 votes. 
However, this level of support was completely obscured by the electoral performance of 
the main political parties in Poland. 
 
The Magyar Föderalista Part also did not feature independently in recent elections in 
Slovakia in 2002, 2003 and 2006, but as part of the broader Strana madˇarskej koalície - 
Magyar Koalíció Pártja which achieved 321,069 votes (11.16%) and 20 seats at the 2002 
election to become the fourth largest party and had four Ministerial posts in the coalition 
government. In alliance with other parties, the MKP won control of 5 of the 8 Slovak 
regional councils at the 2003 followed by 11.7% and 20 seats at the 2006 general 
election. In the Czech Republic, there is no electoral record for Moravané, a current full 
EFA member, though the Moravska demokraticka strana (Moravian Democratic Party) 
gained 12,957 votes (0.27%) in 2002. Finally, the Liga Transilvania-Banat became 
involved with the EFA-DPPE before the 2007 Romanian accession, but is a party that 
had no presence in recent Romanian elections, in contrast to the DMR/RMDSZ - 
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Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din 
Romania) which gained 736,863 votes (6.8%) and 27 seats at the 2000 legislative 
elections and 6.2% and 22 seats in 2004. The only other EFA member from enlargement 
was the Polish Peoples Party in Lithuania for which there is no electoral data (though it 
has succeeded in electing an MEP and joining the Greens- EFA group in the European 
Parliament), in contrast to Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles (Lietuvos lenku rinkimu 
akcija), which gained 28,641 list votes (1.95%) and 40,376 constituency votes (2.75%) 
and 2 seats out of 141 seats at the 2000 election and 2 seats and 3.8% in 2004. European 
parliamentary electoral data on all of these parties will be considered below. 
 
The EFA’s limited success in recruiting regionalist parties through EU enlargement is not 
surprising, as it reflects the limited numbers of existing parties in the East and the 
absence of regional structures. The area is characterised by linguistic and national 
minorities, border issues, etc, but these have not played into the EFA’s hands at this 
point. The EFA’s difficulties in the East – in terms of recruiting parties and also 
prospective MEPs – are clearly illustrated in comparison to the traditional party families. 
For example, the Socialist Group in the European Parliament has 6 MEPs from Bulgaria, 
9 MEPs from Hungary, 9 MEPs from Poland and 3 from Malta, whilst the European 
Peoples Party group has 15 MEPs from Poland, 9 from Romania, 8 from Slovakia and 13 
from Hungary. In addition, many of the parties from the 2004 and 2007 accession states 
are large parties and also governing parties. Moreover, as indicated above, some of the 
parties which might be expected to associate with the EFA-DPPE such as the Magyar 
Koalíció Pártja in Slovakia are members of another political group - in this case the EPP. 
The MKP’s two MEPs therefore sit with a non-regionalist party group, giving no aid at 
this stage to the prospects for expanding the MEP-contingent within the European 
Parliament to advance the prospects of a regionalist party group. Thus Eastern 
enlargement may have the effect of adding to the size of the regionalist contingent within 
the European Parliament which is not aligned with the European Free Alliance or a 
regionalist political group within the parliament. 
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However, one of the defining characteristics of the EFA since its inception has been its 
involvement in party-building and alliance construction. The EFA staff in Brussels and 
the Volksunie MEPs in particular, were active in assisting small regionalist parties to 
develop their policies, organisations and electoral capacities.9 Indeed, in terms of 
administration, electoral expertise and organisation, the EFA structure operated as an 
external support system for regionalist parties in France and Italy. Similarly, the EFA 
assisted regionalist parties to construct and maintain electoral alliances for European 
elections in order to increase the chances of regionalist MEPs being elected: evident in 
France, Italy and Spain, with some successes over time. Thus, whilst the current 
electoral/organisational situation of regionalist parties in the accession states looks bleak, 
the EFA-DPPE organisation will seek to improve this situation through intervening to aid 
parties in terms of support, resources and expertise and help create electoral coalitions to 
help Eastern regionalists to surpass electoral thresholds at European, national and 
regional elections. However, even here, we are talking about very small numbers of 
MEPs being elected. 
 
The Highpoint of the EFA-DPPE 
 
The 1999-2004 parliament, can be seen as something of a high point for the EFA parties, 
during which they had their highest number of MEPs elected and formed a more 
substantial component of the Green-EFA political group. Though not a regionalist group, 
the alliance with the Greens was solid and involved a series of common policy initiatives. 
Moreover, the EFA helped establish a political group in the Committee of the Regions - 
the European Alliance – to extend the family’s EU institutional representation into the 
COR for the first time.  However, even at its peak, the downside of this situation was that 
the EFA contingent only involved 3 member states – Belgium, Spain and the UK – and a 
small number of parties. Marginal changes to support for those parties with two MEPS 
(Plaid Cymru, SNP and SPIRIT) or reduced representation of member states in the 
European Parliament due to enlargement itself, would have the effect of reducing the 
number of the EFA MEPs significantly. Indeed that was exactly what happened in 2004. 
Plaid was reduced to one MEP, the Volksunie disappeared into successor parties like 
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SPIRIT (De Winter 2006) which is an EFA-DPPE party that sits in the Socialist group 
whilst shifting electoral alliances and losses of electoral support in Spain saw the loss of 
the MEPs who represented the BNG, PNV and Partido Andalucista and only left the 
MEP shared by Eusko Alkartasuna/ERC. The 2004 election therefore had consequences 
for the EFA-DPPE parties within the European Parliament, with little prospect of their 
replacement by regionalist parties from the accession states as was explained above. If 
these problems weren’t enough, the rules of the game for recognition and funding of 
Euro-parties and political groups changed with enlargement. Euro-parties will be required 
to contain at least 8 member parties from the 27 member states, with representatives 
elected at the European, national or regional level. Whilst political groups within the 
European Parliament will have to comprise MEPs representing at least 20% of the 
member states, with a minimum of 20 MEPs needed to form a group (European 
Parliament 2003). 
 
Whilst regionalist parties have experienced a limited role within the European Parliament 
due to the electoral performance of party family members, European integration has 
generated other arenas for regionalist political mobilisation. Both the Committee of the 
Regions and the recognition of Constitutional Regions within the EU have produced new 
opportunities for regionalist parties (Lynch 2004). Within the Committee of the Regions, 
the EFA parties were initially marginalised but following the organisation of COR 
representatives into party groups they developed a more coherent role – though for one 
term of the COR only. Within the COR, EFA aligned with a group of independents from 
English local authorities plus Ireland’s governing party, Fianna Fail, to establish the 
European Alliance as a party group from 1999-2004. The group had clear parallels with 
the organisation of regionalists in the European Parliament, with the need for a formal 
alliance with non-regionalists to establish political groups that would be recognised and 
funded by European institutions. The EFA parties were a minority within the European 
Alliance, but then so were Fianna Fail and the Independents. Clearly, without this group, 
each would be unattached members of the COR and lack committee places and political 
clout. The EFA members within the COR were not marginal figures within the sphere of 
multi-level governance. EFA members of the COR included: Paul Van Grembergen of 
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SPIRIT, the Flemish Minister for Interior, Housing, Civil Service, Foreign Trade and 
Urban Policy; Keith Brown of the SNP, a local council leader; Juan José Ibarretxe of 
PNV, who was President of the Basque Country; Dino Viérin of the Union Valdotaine, 
who was President of the Autonomous Region of Val D’Aosta.10 Thus, four of the 
European Alliance’s COR delegation of ten members came from the EFA parties. 
Amongst the alternate COR members, the EFA was represented by politicians from 
SPIRIT, Plaid Cymru, the PNV and the SNP. Similarly, though the European Alliance 
was a relatively loose grouping of regionalists and non-regionalists, it developed some 
programmatic coherence as necessitated by European institutional rules plus the need for 
group coherence within the COR. The European Alliance had eight main principles, 
which were closely aligned with long-standing EFA policy positions: 
 
• Environmental and Sustainable development as defined in the Brundtland Report 
from the UN with the full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.  
• Peace, détente;  
• Freedom and right of self-determination;  
• Defence of all languages, cultures and local government;  
• An open Europe of autonomous regions and nations;  
• Openness and grass-roots democracy;  
• Sound management of all European structures, in order to prevent fraud and waste.  
• The defence of human rights (European Alliance 2004). 
 
European Alliance members were committed to ‘actively support and vote for an open 
Europe of regions and nations and the highest possible standards for environmental 
protection, workers' health, consumer protection, veterinary rules, social welfare and 
democratic principles. The members commit themselves to work together to obtain and 
defend such rights and equality of treatment. At the same time, they acknowledged the 
full political autonomy of the individual members and groupings.’ (European Alliance 
2004). Thus, similar to previous quasi-regionalist political groups, the European Alliance 
simultaneously adopted common positions and allowed members to act autonomously: 
another uneasy balancing act for the parties involved. However, this version of the 
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European Alliance ran for only one term. From 2004, the organisation was reconstituted 
as the Union for Europe of the Nations-European Alliance group and the EFA-DPPE 
were parties left without a political group to join. Despite EFA-DPPE representation in 
the COR and the presence of EFA parties in regional parliaments and some governments, 
the regionalists found themselves institutionally marginalised within the Committee of 
the Regions. 
 
Regionalist Parties at the 2004 European Elections 
 
The 2004 elections constituted a disaster for the EFA in terms of parliamentary 
representation and electoral support. The number of MEPs dropped to only five11, which 
formed a grouped with 37 Greens MEPs. The non-EFA autonomist MEPs nearly tripled 
the number of EFA MEPs. As we will see further on, this may have considerable 
consequences for keeping the party family’s niche in the European political space, its 
organisational resources and generally for its chances of survival. But first let us examine 
the fortune of individual parties per country and region, encompassing both EFA and 
non-EFA parties. 
 
Starting our regional overview from the North, the Swedish People Party lost 1.1%, but 
with 5.7% of the national vote it still managed to keep its seat in the EP, in spite of the 
fact that number of Finnish MEPs was reduced by two at the 2004 European elections. In 
the UK,12 the SNP suffered a severe defeat: 19.7% of the Scottish vote, or -7.5% 
compared to its unprecedented success at the 1999 Euro elections, where it nearly became 
the first Scottish party (27.2%, or 1.5% less than Scottish Labour), and it also became the 
official opposition party at the first elections to the Scottish Parliament. It managed 
however to keep its two seats in the EP, in spite of the reduction of the number of 
Scottish MEPs from eight to seven. Since 1987 the SNP had not scored below 20%, and 
as also the 2003 regional parliamentary elections the SNP suffered a severed drawback, 
the party leader Swinney decided to resign and was succeeded by his predecessor, 
Salmond, who had awarded his party several historical electoral victories (as he managed 
to do again at the Scottish elections of May 2007). Plaid Cymru suffered an even bigger 
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blow (17.4% of the Welsh vote, or -12.2%) and became Wales’ third party, halving its 
representation to one MEP. Although the number of Welsh MEPs was reduced from five 
to four, this did not cause the loss of the second Plaid seat in the EP. Also here the bad 
score at the European Elections was preceded by a major defeat at the second elections of 
the Welsh Assembly (2003). Contrary to the SNP, the 2007 Welsh elections did not 
produce an impressive comeback (21%, or +1.4%). 
 
The success of the Belgian autonomist parties has become very difficult to measure. 
Since 1993, the Front Démocratique des Francophones has presented a common list with 
the francophone liberal party for all elections except for local ones. In Flanders, after the 
split of the Volksunie into an independist Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie and a post-nationalist 
SPIRIT both inheritors formed electoral cartels with the Flemish Christian Democrats 
and Socialists respectively. It therefore has become impossible to measure the weight of 
these autonomist parties in each cartel, although both cartel lists reaped considerable 
benefits from cooperation. Thus only the Vlaams Blok’s13 performance can be measured, 
and once again it made a considerable leap forward since the last European elections 
(from 15.1% to 23.2% of the Flemish vote) (De Winter, Gomez-Reino and Bulens, 2006). 
Still this leap is less impressive than its score at the Flemish and Brussels elections that 
were held the same day as the European ones (24.2% and more than a third of the votes 
cast for Flemish parties for the parliament of the bilingual Brussels Capital Region, 
34.3%). Finally the PDB (Partei Deutchsprachigen Belgier) did compete for the only seat 
reserved for the German-speaking minority, and obtained 9.3% or (-0.6% compared to 
the 1999 elections). In France, due to the shift from a national constituency to eight 
interregional constituencies, regionalist parties have not put up specific lists but joined 
cartels or did not participate at all.   
 
In Italy, the Lega Nord obtained 5% measured at the national scale, a slight increase of 
+0.5% in spite of the incapacitating health condition of its supreme leader, Umberto 
Bossi, and the fact that a dissident list Lega Lombarda won 0.5%.14 The Sud-tiroler 
Volkspartei obtained 46.7% of the South-Tirolean vote (56.% at the 1999 European 
elections), while the Union Valdôtaine also dropped from 45.9% to 37.5%. In the other 
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Italian regions, the party of the Slovenian minority Slovenska Skupnost was part of the 
Magherita cartel. The Partido Sardo d’Azione presented a common list with the “Lega 
Lombarda”, the Union für Südtirol,  the Liga Fronte Veneto, and Lega Pensionati in the 
constituency Sicily-Sardinia which obtained only 0.5% (2.6% in Sardinia in 1999). 
 
Last but not least, there is the traditionally rich but complex case of Spain, due to its 
multitude of autonomist and regionalist parties, as well as shifting electoral coalition 
behaviour. In 2004, three main autonomist cartels were formed. The first one, GalEusCa 
– Pobles d’Europa, contained the predominant autonomist party of the three historical 
autonomies, the Catalan Convergencia I Unio, the Basque Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
and the Galician Bloque Nacionalista Galego. To this were added a few minor parties 
such as the Valencian Bloc Nationalista Valencià,  Partit Socialista de Mallorca - Entesa 
Nacionalista of the Balearic Islands. A second cartel, Europa de los Pueblos, was formed 
between the main competitor parties to the ones above, the Catalan Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya, the Basque Eusko Alkartasuna, the Valencian Esquerra 
Republicana del Pais Valencià, the Andalusian Asamblea de Izquierdias - Partido 
Socialista de Andalucia, the Conjegu Nacionaliegu Cantabru of Cantabria, the Andecha 
Astur of Asturias, the Iniciativa Ciudadana de la Rioja, and the Chunta Aragonesista. 
Most of these parties are situated on the left of the political spectrum and are of the 
European Free Alliance. Finally, a third cartel, the Coalición Europea, comprised the 
Coalicion Canaria, the Unio Valenciana, the Unio Mallorquina, the Partito Aragones, 
the Convergencia de Democratas de Navarra  and the Partido Andalucista (the latter is 
also an EFA member party) 
 
Hence, a diachronic comparison of the performance of the autonomist-regionalist family 
at the European election in Spain is not clear-cut. If we compare the overall score of this 
family at the state-wide level (Spain constitutes a single constituency, hence the tendency 
to form cartels), we can notice a dramatic decline of the nationalist vote, from 13.97% to 
8.92% in 2004. If one looks at the fortunes of autonomist parties in the four main 
autonomous community, one notices that in Catalonia Convergencia I Unio lost nearly 
half of its voters (from 29.28% to 17.44%), while its more radical competitor Esquerra 
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Republicana de Catalunya  nearly doubled its score from 6.06% to 11.8%. All in all, the 
overall nationalist vote in Catalunya declined considerably, especially the moderate 
section of the nationalist electorate. This shift in power relations between the moderate 
and radical independentist was already announced in the autonomous and statewide 
elections of 2003 and 2004, which led to the expulsion of the CiU from the Catalan 
government, and the formation of a coalition between the ERC, the Catalan Socialists and 
the Iniciativa Verds-Esquerra Alternativa. 
 
In the Basque Country, the predominant nationalist force, the PNV presented a Basque 
cartel with the EA in 1999, obtaining 33.9% of the Basque vote. In 2004, the PNV 
obtained by itself 35.3%, while its left-wing competitor Eusko Alkartasuna obtained 
7.8%. Aralar, the new leftist-independist party, got 1.3%. Most likely this increase in the 
nationalist vote is due to the disappearance of the political wing of the ETA, Euskal 
Herritarrok, that was shut down by law in 2003. The party appealed to its voters to 
abstain. Yet, as in 1999 the EB obtained 19.5%, one must conclude that also in the 
Basque country the nationalist vote declined considerably, especially the most radical 
section.15 In Galicia, also the BNG lost almost half of its voters (21.98% to 12.32%). 
Finally, in Andalucia, Partido Andalucista lost more than half of its voters (from 6.64% 
to 2.57%), while its competitor, the Asamblea de Izquierdias - Partido Socialista de 
Andalucia, obtained only 0.26%. In the other autonomies, the regionalist and autonomist 
parties tended to perform worse than in 1999, like in the Balearic Islands where the PSM 
went down from 9.2% to 3.6% and the Unio Mallorquina from 5.6% to 3.11%. This 
heavy loss was only partially compensated by the score of the Catalan ERC (2.87%), 
which did not compete on the Islands in 1999. On the Canaries, the Coalicion Canaria 
suffered a severe blow, losing about half of its voters (from 33.78% to 16.92%). In the 
less autonomous regions on the mainland, the Partido Aragones lost heavily (from 9.27% 
to 2.94%) while the Chunta Aragonesista declined marginally (from 6.9% to 6.1%). In 
Valencia, the Unio Valenciana got wiped out (down from 4.0% to 0.49%), while the Bloc 
Nacionalista Valencia declined  from 2.4% to 1.1%. In Navarra, the EA obtained 4.8%, 
the PNV 2.1% while the Convergencia de Democratas de Navarra obtained 0.9%. 
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Finally in Asturias, la Rioja and Cantabria the nationalist formations together scored less 
than one percent of the regions’ electorates. 
  
In the new member states, regionalist parties did not fare well, and often did not even 
compete (as a single party) in the European elections, such as in Estonia, Lithuania, 
Czech Republic,16 Hungary, Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia and Poland.17 In Slovakia the 
Hungarian Federalist Party ran as a part of the Party of Hungarian Coalition (Magyar 
Koalíció Pártja) that is basically a Christian conservative party focusing on the 
Hungarians, and obtained 13.2%, and two MEPs that joined the EPP. In Latvia, the ethnic 
Russian party For Human Rights in a Unified Latvia (FHRUL) obtained 10.7% and one 
MEP, and is associated to the EFA by individual membership of its MEP. Hence the new 
member states do not fit well the classic Rokkanite cleavage world, especially regarding 
the centre-periphery cleavage (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982; Seiler, 1995). Apart from some 
problems of protection of cross-border minorities (Hungarians in former territories of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian minorities in the Baltic states, and the territorially 
dispersed Roma) all current east-European countries are "nations with a state". Hence of 
the 112 seats that MEPs of enlargement countries occupy, only three can be considered as 
being captured by an autonomist party, and of these, only one joined the EFA. Thus 
enlargement seriously weakened the relative strength of the EFA vis-à-vis the other 
Europarties. In addition, as the EFA MEPs are usually elected on marginal seats (the last 
remaining seat to be attributed in the constituency), the current enlargement - that costs 
the 15 old member states 56 seats vis-à-vis the 1999-2004 parliament - further reduced 
the number of available seats in the constituencies in which the existing autonomist 
parties compete, and thus further eroded the parliamentary representation of the EFA 
(and also of the Greens).  
 
Before 2004, most autonomist parties obtained generally better results at the European 
elections than at the parliamentary elections in their country, for a variety of reasons 
(more proportional electoral system, more opportunities to form electoral coalitions, 
lower turnout, anti-incumbent governing party vote, and lower campaign costs). De 
Winter's (2000) analysis18 shows that for the entire 1979-1999 period most autonomist 
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parties did indeed obtain better results at European than at general elections. If we make a 
comparison between the regionalists’ scores at the 2004 European elections and at the 
preceding general election, this pattern of superior European performances within the 
region’s electorate is confirmed for SFP (+1.1%), Plaid Cymru (+3.1%), Vlaams Blok 
(+4.4%), Lega Nord (+1.1% at national level), Union Valdotaine (+2.5%), BNG (+0.9%), 
PNV (+2.6%), Eusko Alkartasuna (+1.3%). But in about as many cases the thesis must be 
rejected: for the SNP (-0.4%), PDB (-2.4%), CiU (-3.34%), ERC (-4.1%), CC (-7.4%), 
CHA (-6.0%) and PAR (-1.8%), and the PA (-1.4%).19  If we consider the twenty parties 
included in our table as “equal” and calculate the average of the scores they obtained in 
the 1999 and 2004 elections, the 2004 overall average of 14.5% represents a drop of one 
third vis-à-vis the 1999 exemplary performance (19.3%). Historically speaking, this is the 
lowest average since autonomist parties started to participate in the European elections 
(23% in 1999, 20% in 1984, 16% in 1989 and 18% in 1994; see graph I). 
 
